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Curtis Lee Kyles was convicted of shooting and killing a
sixty year-old woman at the Schwegmann Brothers' grocery store
in New Orleans. Following a mistrial due to a hung jury, Kyles
was tried a second time, convicted of first-degree murder, and
sentenced to death.' At trial he claimed that one of the state's
witnesses had framed him. Before the first trial, this witness
changed his story to the police regarding how he knew Kyles and
why he suspected that Kyles might be the murderer. Before the
second trial, the witness again changed important elements of his
story. However, the state disclosed none of these inconsistencies
to the defense. Further, the police had evidence linking the
witness to other crimes at Schwegmann Brothers', including an
unrelated murder at that location. The police did not disclose this
information to the defense; they did not even disclose it to the
prosecutor.'
Charles Jay Auten was convicted of conspiracy to negotiate
stolen money orders.' One of the government's key witnesses
was an unindicted coconspirator who had been granted immunity
before the trial. This witness admitted to a prior forgery convic-
tion but denied any other convictions. Had the prosecutor di-
rected a simple inquiry to the National Crime Information Cen-
ter, he would have discovered two additional convictions. Because
the prosecutor did not undertake such an inquiry, Auten could
not aggressively impeach the witness's testimony.4
The defense in both of these cases sought new trials based on
the Supreme Court's decision in Brady v Maryland, which held
that a prosecutor violates the Due Process Clause when he fails
to disclose material evidence favorable to the accused.5 By recog-
nizing that basic fairness and the integrity of the criminal pro-
t BA 1993, Carleton College; J.D. Candidate 1997, The University of Chicago.
' Kyles v Whitley, 115 S Ct 1555, 1560 (1995).
2 Id at 1563-64, 1568.
3 United States v Auten, 632 F2d 478, 480 (5th Cir 1980).
4 Id at 480-81.
5 373 US 83, 87 (1963).
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cess were at stake, Brady departed from the view of criminal
trials as purely adversarial contests. The Brady rule rests on the
notion that a criminal trial is a search for the truth. As Justice
Fortas later asserted, 'The State's obligation is not to convict, but
to see that, so far as possible, truth emerges."6
There are three elements to a successful Brady claim: "(a)
suppression [of evidence] by the prosecution..., (b) the
evidence's favorable character for the defense, and (c) the materi-
ality of the evidence."7 The term "suppression" seems to have
sprung from the Brady Court's understanding of pre-Brady cases.
The Court traced the origin of the Brady rule to its 1935 decision
in Mooney v Holohan.' That case involved a prosecutor's deliber-
ate presentation of testimony known to be perjured. The Court
held that the Due Process Clause "cannot... be satisfied by
mere notice and hearing if a State has contrived a conviction
through the pretense of a trial which in truth is but used as a
means of depriving a defendant of liberty through a deliberate
deception of court and jury."9 The Court later expanded the rule
to include cases in which the prosecution does not solicit the
"false evidence, [but] allows it to go uncorrected when it ap-
pears."10
The early cases thus focused not on the suppression of
evidence but rather on the presentation of evidence known to be
false. Still, one could characterize these cases as suppression
cases because the prosecutor did not disclose evidence that the
defense could have used to impeach the false testimony.1 By
using the perjury cases in support of its holding, the Brady Court
6 Giles v Maryland, 386 US 66, 98 (1967) (Fortas concurring). See also William J.
Brennan, Jr., The Criminal Prosecution: Sporting Event or Quest for Truth? A Progress
Report, 68 Wash U L Q 1, 18 (1990) ("Rules of fairness in a criminal trial must de-
rive... from careful attention to the trial's internal truth-finding function."). As one
commentator has pointed out, a broad reading of Brady would fundamentally change the
criminal process from an accusatorial to an inquisitorial system. Barbara Allen Babcock,
Fair Play: Evidence Favorable to an Accused and Effective Assistance of Counsel, 34 Stan
L Rev 1133, 1144 (1982). The Supreme Court has never explicitly recharacterized the
criminal process as a search for truth. In response to Justice Fortas, Justice Harlan said
in a dissenting opinion that the Constitution does not demand a fundamental "alter[ation
in] the character and balance of our present systems of criminal justice." Giles, 386 US at
117 (Harlan dissenting).
" Moore v Illinois, 408 US 786, 794-95 (1972).
8 Brady, 373 US at 86, citing Mooney v Holohan, 294 US 103, 112 (1935).
8 Mooney, 294 US at 112.
Napue v Illinois, 360 US 264, 269 (1959).
The Supreme Court has specifically held that prosecutors have a duty under Brady
to disclose impeachment evidence. United States v Bagley, 473 US 667, 676 (1985), citing
Giglio v United States, 405 US 150, 154 (1972).
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implicitly incorporated their rationale, the search for truth, into
its holding that the Due Process Clause prohibits "the suppres-
sion by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an ac-
cused .... ."
The Supreme Court's cases since Brady indicate that the
government, to discharge its obligation, must sometimes seek out
evidence favorable to the accused not yet in its possession. 3 But
the Court has offered extremely little discussion of how to cir-
cumscribe this rule. The Court's decisions in these cases fail to
tell prosecutors when and where they must look to satisfy their
disclosure obligations. 4 Various federal and state courts have
had more opportunities to wrestle with this issue, but they have
not addressed it squarely. Loose language in some opinions has
left the misleading impression that courts are stating strict rules;
'2 Brady, 373 US at 87. The language of "suppression" has stuck, but it is somewhat
misleading. As Mooney and Napue suggest, "suppression" connotes some intentional act of
hiding evidence from the defense. Better would be the language of "disclosure," in the
double sense of revealing what one has and uncovering what is necessary. See Victor
Bass, Comment, Brady v. Maryland and the Prosecutor's Duty to Disclose, 40 U Chi L Rev
112, 121 (1972) (arguing in favor of the language of "nondisclosure" instead of "suppres-
sion"). "Disclosure" communicates better Brady's character, since the obligation attaches
regardless of the prosecutor's good faith or intent. Brady, 373 US at 87.
13 Kyles, 115 S Ct at 1560, 1568 (holding the prosecutor responsible for evidence un-
known to him but known to the police); Giglio v United States, 405 US 150, 154 (1972)
(holding a prosecutor responsible for information known by another prosecutor in his
office); Pennsylvania v Ritchie, 480 US 39, 58 (1987) (requiring trial court to examine
government files not in the prosecutor's office).
"4 The Supreme Court and commentators have focused on the standard of materiali-
ty, which concerns the effect the suppressed evidence could have had on the case and
consequently whether the new trial remedy is appropriate. In short, the Court wants to
ensure that the new trial has a good chance of reaching a different result because of the
new, previously undisclosed evidence. See United States v Agurs, 427 US 97 (1976), and
United States v Bagley, 473 US 667 (1985), both of which extensively analyze the materi-
ality question. For commentary on the materiality standard, see generally Terrence J.
Galligan, Comment, The Prosecutor's Duty to Disclose Exculpatory Evidence After United
States v. Bagley, 1 Georgetown J Legal Ethics 213 (1987); Nicholas A. Lambros, Note,
Conviction and Imprisonment Despite Nondisclosure of Evidence Favorable to the Accused
by the Prosecution: Standard of Materiality Reconsidered, 19 New Eng J on Crim & Civ
Confinement 103 (1993). This Comment addresses the theoretically distinct issue of when
the government has suppressed evidence, that is, when the government failed to disclose
evidence it should have. One commentator has suggested that the standard of materiality
should be related to how courts analyze nondisclosure. See Bass, Comment, 40 U Chi L
Rev at 123 (cited in note 12) (arguing that if the courts apply a stringent standard on the
suppression prong of Brady, then the standard of materiality could be low).
For a discussion of the suppression or nondisclosure prong of the Brady analysis, see
Stephen P. Jones, Note, The Prosecutor's Constitutional Duty to Disclose Exculpatory Evi-
dence, 25 U Memphis L Rev 735, 756-61 (1994). This Note contains a good discussion of
individual cases, but it does not offer much analysis of how to reconcile them, treating
each case as an isolated event.
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however, more careful analysis reveals that these "rules" are
often ad hoc and case specific, and they do not adequately de-
scribe the full range of Brady duties. Thus, prosecutors find
themselves without proper guidance regarding their obligations,
and defense attorneys find themselves without a clear sense of
what they can expect.
This Comment clarifies how courts should approach Brady
claims. It exposes the loose language of the courts, uncovers the
various factors that affect Brady obligations, and demonstrates
how the interaction of these factors, properly considered, yields a
better account of the prosecutor's obligations. In addition, this
Comment offers a new way to characterize Brady duties. Tradi-
tionally, Brady is understood as enunciating the duties only of
the prosecutor. This Comment suggests that Brady is better
understood as setting forth duties for all state actors, although it
imposes special duties on prosecutors. This new understanding of
procedural duties sheds light on the nature of the government's
obligation in criminal cases to serve the truth.'
Part I distinguishes two kinds of Brady claims: "classic" and
"search." Part II sets out the courts' descriptions of the
prosecutor's search Brady obligations and shows their inadequa-
cy. Drawing on the courts' holdings, it then presents a more
precise account of the prosecutor's search Brady obligations. Part
Ill revisits the case law to demonstrate that Brady imposes
duties not only on prosecutors, but on all state actors. Part IV
explains how this understanding of Brady clarifies the analysis
and shows how it affects the results of Brady claims.
I. Two KINDS OF BRADY CLAIMS
This section reviews the Supreme Court's jurisprudence on
Brady claims. It begins by classifying Brady claims as either
classic Brady claims or search Brady claims. It then considers
the elaboration of Brady in subsequent Supreme Court cases.
While the Court has had several opportunities to revisit Brady, it
has shed little light on the nature of Brady obligations.
The classic Brady claim involves the post-conviction discov-
ery that the prosecutor failed to disclose to the defendant materi-
" While a prosecutor may have a duty to disclose evidence to the defense under the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure (Rule 16), under the Jencks Act, 18 USC § 3500
(1994), or under rules of professional conduct, see the Model Rules of Professional Con-
duct Rule 3.8(d) (1995), this Comment discusses only the state's constitutional obligations
under the Due Process Clause.
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al evidence in his possession that was favorable to the defense.
In Brady, the prosecutor failed to disclose the statement of
Brady's companion who had admitted strangling the victim in the
murder for which they both were convicted. 6 This statement,
the Court found, was material to determining whether Brady
should receive the death penalty. Because material evidence had
been withheld, the Court ordered that Brady be resentenced.'7
Although the background principles of the classic Brady claim re-
main important to this analysis, this Comment is primarily con-
cerned with the state's obligations revealed by the second kind of
Brady claim, what this Comment will call search Brady."8
A search Brady claim arises when the prosecutor fails to
gather, or to receive from others, evidence that might be material
and favorable to the defense.'9 The Supreme Court has consid-
ered search Brady questions only three times. It has offered little
analysis and has failed to explain fully the scope of search Brady
duties.
In Giglio v United States, the prosecutor handling the trial
failed to disclose to the defense that the government had prom-
ised leniency to a key prosecution witness, a promise that the
defense could have used as impeachment evidence." The prose-
cutor who handled the grand jury stage of the case had promised
leniency but told the trial prosecutor that he had not. The trial
prosecutor could not disclose to the defense that the promise had
16 Brady, 373 US at 84.
Id at 90.
1 While the terms "classic Brady" and "search Brady" are original, some courts have
made the distinction. See, for example, United States v Brooks, 966 F2d 1500, 1502 (DC
Cir 1992) (distinguishing between the "duty to disclose exculpatory information" and the
"duty to search possible sources for such information"); Commonwealth v Donahue, 396
Mass 590, 487 NE2d 1351, 1355-56 (1986) (distinguishing between cases in which the
prosecutor possesses the evidence and those that oblige the prosecutor to obtain exculpa-
tory evidence from elsewhere).
' Some courts appear to deny that the prosecutor ever has a duty to search for in-
formation not in his actual possession. See United States v Escobar, 842 F Supp 1519,
1530 (E D NY 1994) (rejecting request to have prosecutor examine government agent-
witnesses' personnel files because "the prosecutor is not responsible for knowing what is
in the files of other agencies"); United States v Moore, 25 F3d 563, 569 (7th Cir 1994), cert
denied as Anderson v United States, 115 S Ct 341 (1994) (rejecting notion that prosecutor
had duty to use due diligence to discover exculpatory evidence since "Brady simply does
not apply unless the prosecutor had knowledge of the exculpatory information"); Common-
wealth v Daigle, 379 Mass 541, 399 NE2d 1063, 1068 (1980) ("he Commonwealth is not
obligated to collect and assemble the criminal records of its witnesses for the defendant.").
As the following discussion makes clear, to the extent that these cases mean to deny the
possibility of search Brady claims, they are incorrect.
'o 405 US 150, 150-51 (1972).
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been made because he did not know about it. Nonetheless, the
Court, citing principles of agency but offering little analysis,
attributed knowledge of the promise to the trial prosecutor and
ordered a new trial.2'
In Pennsylvania v Ritchie, the Supreme Court implicitly
recognized that Brady may require the prosecutor to examine
files held by other government agencies to determine whether
they contain any material evidence favorable to the defense."
The defendant was charged with raping his thirteen year-old
daughter. Under Pennsylvania law, Pennsylvania's Children and
Youth Services (CYS), a state agency that investigates cases of
suspected mistreatment, could only release its confidential re-
ports under certain enumerated circumstances. At the time of
Ritchie's trial, those situations did not include release to law
enforcement officials for use in a criminal investigation." As a
result, the prosecutor had not seen the fie, did not have access to
it, and, accordingly, did not comply with the defense request to
provide it. Nonetheless, the court held that, under Brady, Ritchie
was "entitled to have the CYS fie reviewed.., to determine
whether it contains information that probably would have
changed the outcome of his trial."' The Court never actually
discussed why the prosecutor must review the fie. In fact, the
Court seemed unaware that it was passing on a search Brady
claim at all.
In Kyles v Whitley, discussed above, the Court explicitly
extended the holding in Giglio beyond the prosecutor's office.2
The Court held that the prosecutor remains responsible for pro-
21 Id at 152-55.
- 480 US 39, 57-60 (1987). The mere failure to examine the file is not necessarily a
Brady violation calling for a new trial. A violation has occurred only if the evidence that
the state actor ought to have examined actually turns out to contain material and excul-
patory evidence. Id at 61. See text accompanying note 7.
Idat44n2.
24 Id at 57-58. It is worth noting that the Ritchie Court ordered a review of the file by
the trial court, not the prosecutor. This may have been in deference to the Pennsylvania
statute, which allowed an exception to its confidentiality rule when a "'court of competent
jurisdiction [issues] a court order.'" Id at 44 n 2, quoting 11 Pa Stat Ann § 2215(a)
(Purdon Supp 1986). Ordinarily, since the duty of disclosure belongs to the government,
the prosecutor will review the file himself, without submitting it to the court. Conceivably,
the Supreme Court could have ordered the trial court to issue an order allowing the
prosecutor to review the file. Why it did not is something of a mystery. See Brooks, 966
F2d at 1504-05 (citing cases).
2 As the D.C. Circuit later noted, the Ritchie court "appears to have assumed" that
Brady requires the prosecutor to search government files outside of her office. Brooks, 966
F2d at 1502.
115 S Ct 1555, 1567-68 (1995).
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ducing evidence favorable to the defense even when police fail to
bring such evidence to the prosecutor's attention.' The Court
provided a brief justification for holding the prosecutor responsi-
ble for what the police knew: "[Alny argument for excusing a
prosecutor from disclosing what he does not happen to know
about boils down to a plea to substitute the police for the prose-
cutor, and even for the courts themselves, as the final arbiters of
the government's obligation to ensure fair trials."2"
In none of these cases has the Supreme Court specified how
far the prosecutor must go to find evidence favorable to the ac-
cused. In the absence of guidance from the Supreme Court, lower
courts have struggled to define the scope of the prosecutor's du-
ties to search for the truth and disclose evidence. The next sec-
tion explores the different approaches adopted by the courts.
II. SEARCH BRADY OBLIGATIONS IN THE LOWER COURTS
Left to their own devices, lower courts are in disarray over
the precise scope of Brady duties and the proper rationales be-
hind them. This section explores the approaches taken by those
courts. In particular, it highlights a disjunction between the
stated rationales the courts offer to explain their decisions and
the actual factors that underlie their rulings.
The clearest cases of nondisclosure involve evidence that is
both in the government's possession and unavailable to the de-
fense. Technically speaking, the prosecution cannot disclose that
which it does not possess.29 However, relying on Giglio, the
courts have recognized that actual possession by the prosecutor is
not essential to a Brady claim; constructive possession will do.
Once we recognize that evidence constructively possessed can be
the basis of a Brady claim, we have recognized the possibility of
search Brady claims. Some courts, however, refuse to extend that
' Id at 1560. This "extension" surprised no one. Courts had consistently held prose-
cutors responsible for information held by the police prior to Kyles. Wayne R. LaFave and
Jerold H. Israel, Criminal Procedure § 20.7 at 893 (West 2d ed 1992) ("Lower courts have
regularly held that the prosecution's (disclosure] obligation... extends to the files of
those police agencies that were responsible for the primary investigation in the case.").
28 Kyles, 115 S Ct at 1568.
2 See, for example, United States v Meros, 866 F2d 1304, 1309 (11th Cir 1989)
(Brady only applies to the prosecutor and those under his authority.); United States v
Dominguez-Villa, 954 F2d 562, 566 (9th Cir 1992) (prosecution under no duty to turn over
materials not under its control); Commonwealth v Tucceri, 412 Mass 401, 589 NE2d 1216,
1220 (1992) (Brady duties extend only to evidence in the possession of prosecutor or police
officers who worked on the case.).
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rationale to situations in which the defense can obtain the infor-
mation without the prosecutor's aid.
The following subsections survey the courts' language regard-
ing search Brady claims. The narrow holdings in this area are
often difficult to express as broad propositions, and although the
courts often speak as if they are laying down general rules, care-
ful analysis reveals that they are not. Instead, the courts are
focusing on particular factors of importance in determining the
prosecutor's search Brady obligations. Taken together, the cases
reveal that in search Brady cases, courts use three competing
notions to address the issue of the prosecutor's constructive pos-
session of evidence and a fourth to address the availability of
evidence to the defense.
A. What Courts Say
1. Same-sovereign constructive possession.
Borrowing from the language in Rule 16(a)(1)(C) of the Fed-
eral Rules of Criminal Procedure, some courts have stated that
no Brady obligations arise unless the evidence at issue is within
the "government's actual possession, custody, or control."0 Evi-
dence held exclusively by agents of a separate sovereign (for
example, federal rather than state agents or agents of another
state government) is not considered in the possession, custody, or
control of the prosecutor."
The Giglio Court's reference to agency theory may justify
circumscribing the scope of search Brady obligations to the extent
of a single sovereign.32 The First Circuit has analogized the sin-
gle-sovereign approach to the doctrines of corporate criminality.
Such responsibility, the court pointed out, is "founded on the
collective knowledge of its individual employees and agents.
There is no reason why similar principles of institutional respon-
® United States v Dominguez-Villa, 954 F2d 562, 566 (9th Cir 1992) (citing FRCrP
16(aX1)(C)). The Ninth Circuit has made clear elsewhere that this rule applies under
Brady as well as the Federal Rules. See United States v Aichele, 941 F2d 761, 764 (9th
Cir 1991), citing United States v Gatto, 763 F2d 1040, 1049 (9th Cir 1985) ("The prosecu-
tion is under no [Brady] obligation to turn over materials not under its controL").
"1 Dominguez-Villa, 954 F2d at 566; Aichele, 941 F2d at 764. See also United States v
Walker, 720 F2d 1527, 1535 (11th Cir 1983) (stating "we do not believe that knowledge of
any deal between state officials and [a witness] can be imputed to the federal prosecutor");
United States v Kern, 12 F3d 122, 126 (8th Cir 1993) (refusing to "impute the knowledge
of the State of Nebraska to a federal prosecutor").
Giglio, 405 US at 154 (discussing procedures to insure communication of "all
relevant information" in prosecutor's office).
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sibility should not be used to analyze the actions of individual
government attorneys called upon to represent the government
as an institution in matters of... disclosure obligations."' The
prosecutor represents the sovereign for which she works. She is
an agent of that government and that government alone. She
cannot be held responsible for information held outside the insti-
tution that she represents.
Yet the single-sovereign approach produces awkward results.
In the war on drugs, joint state and federal prosecutions have
become common. It seems bizarre in such a situation to grant a
new trial if a federal prosecutor fails to disclose information held
by the FBI, but not if the same information was held by the local
police aiding the investigation. United States v Dominguez-Villa
provides another good illustration.' In that case, the court re-
quired the federal prosecutor to review, for possible impeachment
evidence, the personnel files of all federal agents who were going
to testify at trial. However, the court refused to require precisely
the same review of the personnel fies of state police officers who
were to testify." These absurd results show that requiring same-
sovereign possession as a necessary condition of a search Brady
claim goes too far. Such an approach draws arbitrary lines and
too easily allows the government to suppress or avoid the truth,
contrary to Brady's motivating principle.
2. Constructive possession within the prosecution team.
Other courts have suggested that search Brady obligations
extend to what they call the "prosecution team." 6 Different
courts have defined the prosecution team in different ways. New
York courts, for example, have limited the prosecution team to
personnel working for "law enforcement agenc[ies]," 7 excluding
agencies that perform "separate administrative functions."3
Federal courts have tended to define the prosecution team with
broader language. The Fifth Circuit, for example, has "declined to
draw a distinction between different agencies [of government], fo-
cusing instead on the 'prosecution team' which includes both
United States v Osorio, 929 F2d 753, 761 (1st Cir 1991) (citations omitted).
954 F2d 562, 565 (9th Cir 1992).
3 Id at 565-66.
See, for example, United States v Antone, 603 F2d 566, 569 (5th Cir 1979); United
States v Spagnoulo, 960 F2d 990, 994 (11th Cir 1992) (citation omitted).
'7 People v Berkley, 157 AD2d 463, 549 NYS2d 392, 394 (NY App Div 1990).
People v White, 210 AD2d 446, 620 NYS2d 437, 438 (NY App Div 1994), citing
People v Kelly, 209 AD2d 436, 618 NYS2d 822, 825 (NY App Div 1994).
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investigative and prosecutorial personnel."39 The language may
be different, but the thrust is the same. The prosecution team
consists of agents who had important contact with the prosecu-
tion during either the investigation or prosecution of the case.'
The prosecution team approach rejects sovereignty as a rele-
vant consideration. Instead, the extent of cooperation is determi-
native. If the court finds in a federal prosecution that "state
agents were in a real sense members of the prosecutorial team,"
it will consider evidence in the possession of the state agents to
be constructively possessed by the prosecutor.4' Under this ap-
proach, the prosecutor represents not only the sovereign for
which she works, but also all of the various government agents
who worked with her and provided her information leading to the
prosecution.42
The "prosecution team" language makes more sense than
drawing an arbitrary line at sovereignty. This approach more
realistically accounts for intersovereign cooperation and avoids
the formalism of the single-sovereign approach. Still, there are
problems with this approach as well. A state file not held by a
state member of the prosecution team might contain evidence
favorable to the accused. If the prosecutor knows this and can
easily obtain the evidence, why should she not be required to
obtain it and disclose it to the defense?' Although some courts
have suggested that possession by the prosecution team is neces-
'9 Antone, 603 F2d at 569 (citations omitted). See also United States v Meros, 866 F2d
1304, 1309 (11th Cir 1989) ("Brady ... applies only to information possessed by the
prosecutor or anyone over whom he has authority."); Smith v Fairman, 769 F2d 386, 391
(7th Cir 1985) (Brady applies to information held by "a state instrumentality closely
aligned with the prosecution.").
Antone, 603 F2d at 569 (finding Brady violation where state and federal govern-
ments "pooled their investigative energies to a considerable extent"); Berkley, 549 NYS2d
at 394 (rejecting Brady claim because rape counseling center's refusal to turn over
victim's statements to prosecutors established that the two entities were not working
together); United States v Wood, 57 F3d 733, 737 (9th Cir 1995) (holding that when
agency "has consulted with the prosecutor in the steps leading to prosecution," evidence
held by that agency will be treated the same as evidence held by the prosecutor himself).
41 Antone, 603 F2d at 570.
' There is some Supreme Court language supporting this view. In Kyles, the Court
stated that the prosecutor "has a duty to learn of favorable evidence known to the others
acting on the government's behalf in the case .... " 115 S Ct at 1567. However, the facts
of the case involved evidence suppressed by local police in a local prosecution. It is possi-
ble that the Court will restrict Kyles to its facts if faced with a cross-sovereignty case.
' See United States v Auten, 632 F2d 478, 481 (5th Cir 1980) (finding a Brady
violation when the prosecutor failed to run an FBI or National Crime Information Center
check to uncover the complete criminal record of a witness).
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sary for a valid search Brady claim, this proposition is too gener-
al to describe accurately such an unsettled area of law."
3. Availability of the evidence to the prosecutor.
Recognizing that the prosecution team notion may be
underinclusive, some courts have suggested that the prosecution
has constructive possession of any "information readily available
to it."' According to this view, the notion of the prosecution
team does not express the full extent of the government's duties.
"The 'prosecution team' concept does not.., relieve the govern-
ment of its duty to inquire about Brady information when the
known facts warrant further inquiry into facts readily avail-
able."' This view requires the prosecutor to acquire certain
items not within his (or his sovereign's or team's) actual posses-
sion. The court would then hold that the prosecutor had construc-
tive possession because he easily could have had actual posses-
sion.
For instance, in United States v Deutsch, the defendants
were convicted of bribing a postal employee.47 When the defen-
dants asked for the personnel file of the employee whom they
were accused of bribing, the prosecutor replied that he did not
possess it, and the trial court, supporting the prosecutor, held the
post office was not an arm of the prosecution. The appellate court
faulted the prosecution for failing to obtain the file, declaring
that "different 'arms' of the government, particularly
when.., closely connected ... are [not] severable entities."'
The court focused on how easily the prosecutor could have ob-
tained the fie. In fact, the court seemed irritated that, given the
ease with which the fie could have been acquired, the prosecutor
failed to get it.49
Nonetheless, in those circuits using the prosecution team language, a Brady claim
may require showing that the evidence was held by a member of the prosecution team.
See text accompanying notes 36-40. But the Supreme Court has never affirmed this rule.
' United States v Auten, 632 F2d 478, 481 (5th Cir 1980); Williams v Whitley, 940
F2d 132, 133 (5th Cir 1991). See also United States v Perdomo, 929 F2d 967, 970 (3d Cir
1991) (holding that "the prosecution is obligated to produce certain evidence actually or
constructively in its possession or accessible to it").
' United States v Burnside, 824 F Supp 1215, 1257 (N D Ill 1993).
47 475 F2d 55, 56 (5th Cir 1973), overruled on other grounds as United States v
Henry, 749 F2d 203 (5th Cir 1984).
' Deutsch, 475 F2d at 57. See also Martinez v Wainwright, 621 F2d 184, 186-89 (5th
Cir 1980) (requiring state prosecutor to go to FBI to acquire rap sheet of victim in murder
trial).
" Deutsech, 475 F2d at 57 (The prosecution "did not even deny access, but only
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The language of "readily available" information, while appli-
cable in the variety of circumstances in which search Brady
claims arise, lacks some of the clarity that the other "rules" pro-
vide. To be sure, "no formula defining the scope of the duty to
search can be expected to yield easily predicted results."" But
courts should aspire to give more detailed guidance to prosecu-
tors and defense attorneys than they have in these cases.
4. Availability of the evidence to the defendant.
Sometimes courts suggest that a search Brady claim might
succeed or fail depending on how easy it is for the defendant to
find the evidence on his own, regardless of how easy it is for the
prosecutor to obtain it. 5 Brady is not supposed to shift the job
of defense investigation to the prosecution. The defendant will
not have a Brady claim, these courts say, if, with "reasonable
diligence," he could have uncovered the evidence without the aid
of the prosecutor." If the defendant could have uncovered the
evidence without the aid of the prosecutor, then the defendant's
failure to do so is his own fault and not attributable to the pros-
ecutor. This means that if the defendant knew of the possibility
that a government office had exculpatory information and that
office was subject to subpoena, then the failure to subpoena the
information will negate a search Brady claim.53
A broad availability-to-the-defendant rule is inadequate.
Such a broad rule would punish the defendant severely for his
attorney's incompetence, even in a case of clear prosecutorial
impropriety. For example, if the prosecution's key witness has a
present possession without even an attempt to remedy the deficiency.").
'o United States v Brooks, 966 F2d 1500, 1504 (DC Cir 1992).
51 The availability of the evidence to the defense is not a matter of constructive pos-
session by the prosecutor. Rather, it is a way for the prosecutor to defeat a Brady claim
despite his constructive possession of the evidence.
2 See, for example, United States v Boyd, 833 F Supp 1277, 1354 (N D 11 1993),
aff'd, 55 F3d 239 (7th Cir 1995) (The scope of the prosecutor's duty to search "excludes
information that the defense either (i) had actually obtained prior to trial through some
independent means, or (ii) could have discovered through the exercise of reasonable dili-
gence.") (citations omitted); United States v Aichele, 941 F2d 761, 764 (9th Cir 1991)
("When... a defendant has enough information to be able to ascertain the supposed
Brady material on his own, there is no suppression by the government.") (citations omit-
ted); United States v Ellender, 947 F2d 748, 757 (5th Cir 1991) ("[W]here the defendant's
own lack of reasonable diligence is the sole reason for not obtaining the pertinent materi-
al, there can be no Brady claim.").
' Boyd, 833 F Supp at 1357 ("It is well settled that defendants cannot base a Brady
claim on information that could have been obtained from other sources via subpoena.")
(citing cases).
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long criminal record, then the prosecutor must disclose this infor-
mation to the defendant in the interest of truth and fairness.
Why should it matter whether the defense attorney failed,
through incompetence, to seek independently the witness's crimi-
nal record, even though such an investigation would have been
easy? Any court ignoring the prosecutor's failure to disclose
such information "would be inviting and placing a premium on
conduct unworthy of representatives of the United States Govern-
ment 55-- unworthy in the sense that it demonstrates indiffer-
ence to the truth. To be sure, the defense attorney bears respon-
sibility for failing to uncover the evidence, but the defense
attorney's failure to do his duty does not relieve the prosecutor of
his own duty to seek the truth.
B. The Meaning Behind the Language
A careful analysis of the case law reveals that the "rules" set
out above fail to tell the whole story. Rather, courts look to sever-
al related but distinct factors in reaching their decisions. The law
appears confused because courts do not always articulate all of
the relevant factors in particular cases. This leaves the inaccu-
rate impression that one factor alone disposes of the question.
The courts consider four basic factors in reaching their con-
clusions. First, courts examine the context in which the evidence
is found and its relation to the case. The closer the relation be-
tween the context and the case, the more likely courts are to find
a violation. Second, courts examine the effort a prosecutor must
expend to uncover the evidence. As that effort grows, courts be-
come less likely to find a violation. Third, courts examine the
likelihood, based on what the prosecutor knows, that the evi-
At this point, the Brady obligation begins to overlap with a claim for ineffective
assistance of counsel. See Strickland v Washington, 466 US 668, 686 (1984) ("The
benchmark for judging any claim of ineffectiveness must be whether counsel's conduct so
undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be
relied on as having produced a just result."). The important point is to ensure that we
have rules that can correct for incompetence when it appears, but that do not adversely
affect the incentives of good defense attorneys. Here, we need not worry about competent
defense attorneys failing to conduct independent investigations. Defense attorneys know
that the prosecutor is neither capable of disclosing nor obliged to disclose all relevant
evidence favorable to the defense. Prosecutors cannot recognize as well as defense attor-
neys the significance of a particular item of evidence in the context of the defense's entire
case. Further, the materiality standard allows certain favorable evidence that the defense
would surely want to obtain to remain undisclosed. For further discussion on how reliance
on the state's Brady obligations does not substitute for good defense investigation, see
notes 83 and 105.
' United States v Auten, 632 F2d 478, 481 (5th Cir 1980).
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dence, as yet unexamined by the defense, will turn out to be
material and favorable to the defense. As the evidence becomes
more likely to have a substantial impact on the case, courts be-
come more inclined to find Brady obligations. Finally, courts look
at the ease with which the defendant could obtain the evidence.
The easier it is for the defendant to uncover the evidence without
prosecutorial aid, the harder it is for him to prevail on his Brady
claim. 5
6
These four factors seek to describe how the courts should
determine whether a prosecutor has behaved with due regard for
the need to uncover the truth. They help courts understand what
a prosecutor should have known and, therefore, disclosed to the
defense. They do not lend themselves to precise quantification,
but rather involve an imprecise balancing. While no formula can
possibly describe every case, these factors provide a good frame-
work for analysis. Further, while the overall analysis is impre-
cise, some relatively precise rules appear. For example, the con-
text and potential-impact-on-the-case factors impose necessary
minimum standards on the overall analysis. Without reaching
their minimum thresholds, a search Brady claim cannot succeed
no matter how strong the presence of the other factors.
1. Context.
The closer the relation between the context in which the
evidence is found and the key issues in a case, the stronger the
defendant's Brady claim becomes. Interestingly, however, physi-
cal closeness can differ from the contextual, functional closeness.
The facts of United States v Joseph illustrate how evidence
can be physically close to the prosecutor but functionally far
away.57 A government agent served as a key eyewitness for the
prosecution and claimed that he saw the defendant engage in a
drug transaction between 6:00 and 6:30 p.m. on the day in ques-
' The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court has identified a similar set of basic
factors of search Brady problems. See Commonwealth v Donahue, 396 Mass 590, 487
NE2d 1351, 1356 (1986) (listing "the potential unfairness to the defendant; the
defendant's lack of access to the evidence; the burden on the prosecutor of obtaining the
evidence; and the degree of cooperation between State and Federal authorities, both in
general and in the particular case"). The degree of cooperation between the prosecutor
and the agency in possession of the evidence is important to what this Comment terms
the context factor. Further, the potential unfairness to the defendant is another way of
stating the potential impact of the evidence on the case. See text accompanying note 71.
United States v Brooks, 966 F2d 1500 (DC Cir 1992), offers the most thorough judicial
analysis of a search Brady case to date.
57 996 F2d 36, 38-40 (3d Cir), cert denied 114 S Ct 357 (1993).
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tion. In an unrelated case, previously handled by the same pros-
ecutor, the same officer had testified to being in a different loca-
tion at that time. The prosecutor actually possessed the file con-
taining this impeachment evidence but did not notice the incon-
sistency. The court did not find a Brady violation and held that
the prosecutor's conduct was reasonable. Since both prosecutions
were for possession of a controlled substance (rather than distri-
bution), the particular times that each surveillance took place
were 'Just not an important element" in either case, and there-
fore not something that one should expect the prosecutor to have
noticed.58
Conversely, evidence physically far from the prosecutor can
be functionally close to him. In People v Rutter, tried in New
York, the prosecutor put on a witness who claimed to have ob-
served the alleged murder.59 The witness had taken a polygraph
test administered by the Philadelphia police, during which she
had stated that she had not seen the murder. The prosecutor
claimed that he did not violate Brady, since the Philadelphia
police did not apprise him of the existence of the evidence until
mid-trial. The court rejected this argument and found that the
prosecutor's late disclosure of the polygraph transcript violated
Brady.6" Noting that New York and Philadelphia authorities
had worked together closely in investigating the crime, the court
held the New York prosecutor responsible for locating and dis-
closing the evidence in a timely fashion, even though the evi-
dence was in Philadelphia.61
Still, the context factor does impose a strict physical limit on
search Brady obligations. Evidence in the hands of private par-
ties is never subject to a search Brady claim.6" Only evidence in
the possession of some arm of some government can trigger a val-
id Brady claim. Moreover, Brady does not impose a general duty
on the government to investigate." A general duty would re-
quire unrealistic diligence from prosecutors with limited resourc-
es.
Id at 40.
202 AD2d 123, 616 NYS2d 598, 600-01 (NY App Div 1994).
The polygraph transcript was not made available to the defense until after the wit-
ness had testified. The trial court denied a defense request for cross-examination based on
the new evidence. Id at 601.
61 Id at 603-04.
' Deutsch, 475 F2d at 57 (The prosecutor is not "obliged to obtain evidence from
third parties.m").
3 Arizona v Youngblood, 488 US 51, 59 (1988) (rejecting the contention that "the Due
Process Clause is violated when the police fail to use a particular investigatory tool").
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2. The burden on the prosecutor.
The burden and context factors substantially overlap. Defin-
ing context functionally suggests that evidence which is "close"
enough to the prosecutor is not terribly difficult for him to ac-
quire. But when the burden on the prosecutor is only slight, his
duty to search stretches beyond functionally close places. If the
prosecutor can easily acquire the evidence, it may not matter
which state agent possesses it.
For example, state and federal prosecutors can easily obtain
the criminal records of individuals involved in a trial, since the
FBI routinely provides them criminal records on request. This
fact places the burden of acquiring those records on prosecutors,
even when it involves contacting an agent not involved in pros-
ecuting the case." Similarly, an examination of a testifying
officer's personnel file may be necessary in order to ensure that it
does not contain any impeachment evidence."
The cases stressing the ease of the prosecutor's effort suggest
that the defendant must make specific requests for evidence.66
Such precise requests can indeed ease the prosecutor's burden
" See, for example, Martinez v Wainwright, 621 F2d 184, 186-89 (5th Cir 1980)
(requiring state prosecutor to go to FBI to acquire rap sheet of victim in murder trial);
United States v Auten, 632 F2d 478, 481 (5th Cir 1980) (requiring federal prosecutor to
run an FBI or National Crime Information Center check on a witness to uncover the
witness's prior record). But see Commonwealth v Daigle, 370 Mass 541, 399 NE2d 1063,
1068 (1980) ('The Commonwealth is not obligated to collect and assemble the criminal
records of its witnesses for the defendant.").
6 See, for example, United States v Henthorn, 931 F2d 29, 31 (9th Cir 1991) (re-
quiring federal prosecutor to examine personnel fie of testifying Drug Enforcement
Agency and customs agents); Dominguez-Villa, 954 F2d at 565 (rejecting the government's
claim that the defendant must make an initial showing of materiality to compel the
examination).
Examining a testifying officer's personnel file is more controversial than running a
check on other witnesses. Some courts, unlike Dominguez-Villa, require the defendant to
show some reason to believe that the examination will reveal evidence favorable to the
defense. See United States v Andrus, 775 F2d 825, 842-43 (7th Cir 1985) (finding no need
for prosecution to turn over testifying officers' personnel files when the request was based
on "W[m]ere speculation"); United States v Romo, 914 F2d 889, 898-99 (7th Cir 1990),
quoting Andrus, 775 F2d at 843 (refusing to compel search of police officers' personnel
files "without even a hint that impeaching material was contained therein"). Here, the
burden factor intersects with the factor weighing the potential impact of the evidence on
the case-as the evidence becomes more likely to be material, the prosecutor must accept
a greater burden to acquire it.
' See, for example, Henthorn, 931 F2d at 31 ("The obligation to examine the files
arises by virtue of the making of a demand for their production."); Auten, 632 F2d at 480
(emphasizing that defendant had called possibility of witness's convictions to the attention
of the prosecutor in his discovery request); Martinez, 621 F2d at 185-86 (noting that
defendant requested victim's rap sheet before, during, and after trial).
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and should be considered in evaluating a subsequent Brady
claim. When the prosecutor's search might be burdensome, a
specific request can lighten the burden so as to impose an obliga-
tion on the prosecutor to execute the search. A defendant can
trigger an obligation to examine files that are seemingly unrelat-
ed to his case by making a specific request that "explicitly identi-
fies the desired material and is objectively limited in scope." ' Of
course, the state must also possess the evidence that the defen-
dant requests.
But specific requests should not be considered necessary,
especially regarding witnesses whose testimony is crucial to the
prosecution's case.6" That is, as the potential materiality of the
evidence increases, the court is less likely to require the defense
specifically to request evidence. The prosecutor should always
check on the backgrounds of his key witnesses.69 A specific-re-
quest requirement constitutes a trap for the unwary defense
counsel who neglects to request specifically the rap sheet of a key
government informant.0 In general, when the prosecutor can
easily access a state file with evidence potentially favorable to
the accused, he should examine it. Of course, once the prosecutor
examines the file, classic Brady obligations apply.
3. Potential impact on the case.
Courts are more likely to impose search Brady obligations
when they find that the prosecutor had reason to believe that the
fie contained material evidence favorable to the defense at the
time the search should have taken place. Because such "reason to
believe" deals with an unknown, courts have set a very low
Joseph, 996 F2d at 41. See also United States v Brooks, 966 F2d 1500, 1503 (DC
Cir 1992) (finding it -highly relevant that defense counsel pinpointed files that can be
searched without difficulty").
' Brooks, 966 F2d at 1503 (noting that the Auten court did not need to explain why
the prosecutor had to acquire the criminal record of its key witness since the "link to the
case" was clear).
' Two courts have noted the incentive already in place for prosecutors to examine
the backgrounds of their key witnesses. Id at 1502-03 ("Of course the prosecutor's own in-
terest in avoiding surprise at trial gives him a very considerable incentive to search acces-
sible files for possibly exculpatory evidence, quite independent of Brady."); United States v
Osorio, 929 F2d 753, 761 (1st Cir 1991) ("No properly prepared trial lawyer should permit
himself to be surprised by the vulnerability of his witness .... ").
70 Justice Brennan has argued that criminal discovery rules should not be based on a
sporting conception of fairness in which the rules are "designed to ensure that the person
or team with the best skills wins.... Rules of fairness in a criminal trial must derive not
from some effort evenly to match the sides.., but from careful attention to the trial's
internal truth-finding function." Brennan, 68 Wash U L Q at 18 (cited in note 6).
1996] 1689
The University of Chicago Law Review
threshold for likely impact. Assuming the other factors support a
search Brady claim, courts reject such a duty only when it rests
on "utter speculation" that the file in question contains exculpa-
tory information.71
4. Availability of the evidence to the defense.
Some courts reject search Brady claims if they conclude that
the exculpatory evidence was readily available to the defense.72
These courts are rightly concerned with allowing defense attor-
neys to send prosecutors on wasteful searches. But these courts
also fail to recognize that the defense attorney's ability to manip-
ulate the prosecution changes dramatically once the defendant
has been convicted.
The rationale for refusing to honor a Brady claim because
the evidence is available to the defense makes sense in pre-con-
viction defense requests. If the evidence is available to the de-
fense (for example, through subpoena) and the prosecutor does
not think that it is important enough to review, then the prosecu-
tor should not be put to the trouble." Since the subpoena would
give the defendant everything to which he is entitled, putting the
burden on the prosecutor is wasteful. Further, defense counsel
will always prefer to examine the files himself rather than trust
the prosecutor to determine the significance of the evidence to
the defense case.
But when confronted with a post-conviction search Brady
claim, the analysis changes. Where the defense knows about
accessible information helpful to its case before trial, it may prop-
erly obtain that information itself without help from the prosecu-
tor. But if the defense only learns of such information after the
defendant is convicted, its prior availability is irrelevant. Defen-
dants are no longer in a position to manipulate prosecutorial
resources. If the other factors favoring a search Brady claim
impose an obligation on the prosecutor, the prior availability of
the evidence does not mitigate that obligation.74
71 United States v Brooks, 966 F2d 1500, 1504 (DC Cir 1992). See also United States v
Navarro, 737 F2d 625, 630-31 (7th Cir 1984) (rejecting a claim based on "mere specula-
tion").
7 See text accompanying notes 51-55.
' See Commonwealth v Donahue, 396 Mass 590, 487 NE2d 1351, 1355 (1986) (recog-
nizing that "the Brady rule is tempered by ... the practical concern that the prosecutor
not be so burdened that the administration ofjustice is unduly hampered"); Joseph, 996
F2d at 41 (expressing concern that defense attorneys will send prosecutors on "open-ended
fishing expeditions").
' To hold otherwise would encourage duplicative investigations:
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Taken together, the cases identify factors relevant to deter-
mining a prosecutor's disclosure duties, although some courts use
just one. The contextual location of the evidence, the ease with
which the prosecutor can acquire it, and the potential impact on
the case better describe when the prosecutor constructively pos-
sesses evidence than any artificial line drawing. Further, the
prosecutor's duty is rebutted when the disclosure request comes
before trial and the evidence is readily available to the defense.
IlI. REVISITING SEARCH BRADY OBLIGATIONS: OBLIGATIONS
BEYOND THE PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE
This Section reconceptualizes Brady obligations and the
corresponding Brady claims. Up to now, we have considered only
how far prosecutors must go to satisfy their Brady obligations.
This Section deals with who has Brady obligations. Both prosecu-
tors and other state actors should bear Brady obligations. While
both types of state actors should bear Brady obligations, the
extent of their obligations should differ. Prosecutors should bear
both classic Brady and search Brady obligations; nonprosecutors
should only bear classic Brady obligations.
A. Whose Duty Is It Anyway?
In order to state adequate rules for how to approach search
Brady claims, we should reassess how we conceptualize Brady
obligations. The classic formulation of Brady as the prosecutor's
duty to disclose material evidence favorable to the accused in his
possession is an obstacle to properly understanding nondisclosure
of evidence by the government.
The convention of characterizing Brady as the prosecutor's
duty is understandable for at least two reasons. First, the pros-
ecutor usually delivers exculpatory evidence to the defense. He is
the liaison between the state and the defendant. Second, courts
The efficient use of Criminal Justice Act funds to pay and reimburse defense counsel
is a very practical reason why our system of justice should require the government's
counsel to provide the Brady... information to defense counsel rather than have
defense counsel use their time and the sparse CJA funds to try to gather information
favorable to the defense which is already in the government counsel's possession.
United States v Burnside, 824 F Supp 1215, 1261 (N D M1l 1993). See also People v
Ranghelle, 69 NY2d 56, 511 NYS2d 580, 585 (1986) ("Where ... the existence of [the
exculpatory material] is readily ascertainable by the prosecutor, there is no reason to di-
lute the [prosecutor's] obligation by holding that defense counsel should have himself sub-
poenaed the document.").
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may wish to characterize the Brady rule as a duty of prosecutors
because of the unique role they play in the justice system. The
government prosecutor is not an ordinary adversarial attorney.
He "is the representative not of an ordinary party to a controver-
sy, but of a sovereignty... whose interest... in a criminal pros-
ecution is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be
done."75
Nonetheless, to conceive of Brady as simply the prosecutor's
duty is mistaken. To be sure, Brady imposes special duties on the
prosecutor, but it also reaches all state agents. Investigative
officers who represent the state also should share an interest in
seeing that justice be done, as should all state actors. Anyone
who plays a part in bringing the power of the state to bear on the
individual in the form of punishment must share the responsibil-
ity to uncover the truth that comes with that power. Brady viola-
tions need not emanate from the prosecutor or even from the
prosecutor's office alone. Any state officer can violate Brady, 
6
and it would be easier to analyze Brady violations if the courts
recognized this fact expressly.
1. The Supreme Court and the duties of nonprosecutors.
The Supreme Court has never explicitly said that
nonprosecutors share Brady obligations with prosecutors. Still,
the Court's rationale in key cases implicitly recognizes the duties
of nonprosecutors. The Court rooted Brady's obligation to search
for the truth in the Due Process Clause. The prosecutor owes the
defendant a process in which the prosecutor makes a reasonable
effort to uncover the truth. Part II.B described how a court deter-
mines whether the prosecutor made such a reasonable ef-
fort-whether the prosecutor uncovered evidence and disclosed
evidence favorable to the accused that the prosecutor should have
known about. But cases following Brady have made it clear that
a failure to make a reasonable effort to uncover the truth is not
essential to a Brady violation.7
75 Berger v United States, 295 US 78, 88 (1935).
" See Barbee v Warden, Maryland Penitentiary, 331 F2d 842, 846 (4th Cir 1964) ("[it
makes no difference if the withholding [of material and exculpatory evidence] is by offi-
cials other than the prosecutor.").
' Improper conduct by some state actor, however, is essential to a Brady violation.
See text accompanying note 107.
Giglio was the first case suggesting that Brady duties extended beyond the prosecu-
tor. 405 US at 154. In that case, the trial prosecutor was held responsible for evidence
held by another prosecutor in his office. Knowledge of the evidence was imputed to the
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In Kyles, the Court held that "the prosecutor remains respon-
sible for [Brady material] regardless of any failure by the police
to bring favorable evidence to the prosecutor's attention."78 The
Court made clear that:
the individual prosecutor has a duty to learn of any favor-
able evidence known to the others acting on the
government's behalf in the case, including the police. But
whether the prosecutor succeeds or fails in meeting this
obligation... the prosecution's responsibility for failing to
disclose known, favorable evidence rising to a material level
of importance is inescapable.79
The Kyles Court said that Brady imposes a duty on the pros-
ecutor to learn of favorable evidence held by the police. That is,
the prosecutor is strictly liable for failing to discover material
evidence favorable to the accused and held by the police. Here,
the prosecutor can violate the Due Process Clause without ever
having done anything wrong. His search for the truth may have
been diligent; it may have been all that anyone could ask of a
conscientious prosecutor. Nonetheless, if the prosecutor's best
effort fails to produce the proper result-actual discovery of the
evidence-the Court says that the prosecutor violated the Due
Process Clause.0
The Due Process Clause was indeed violated in Kyles, but it
seems more accurate to say that the police, rather than the pros-
ecutor, violated Brady when they concealed evidence favorable to
the accused. To say that the prosecutor in Kyles has Brady duties
even when not at fault is to recognize that due process requires
the police to turn such evidence over to the prosecutor. The Kyles
Court chose, following convention, to characterize the duty as the
prosecutor's. But when police do not turn over the requested
evidence, it makes little sense to locate the violation of the Due
Process Clause in the prosecutor's failure to disclose it.
trial prosecutor even though the trial prosecutor had asked the other prosecutor whether
he had the evidence and was told falsely that there was no evidence. Id at 152. Almost
surely, the trial prosecutor was justified in believing the other prosecutor. Still, the
Supreme Coures discussion of the issue is brief and ambiguous. Kyles makes the point
more clearly. 115 S Ct at 1555.
78 115 S Ct at 1560.
Id at 1567-68 (citations omitted).
Police officers can conceal evidence from even the most diligent prosecutor, since a
prosecutor must rely on the judgment of the police in responding to his requests. It would
waste the prosecutor's time and demean the integrity of the police to expect the prosecu-
tor to sift through the files of police investigators.
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The Kyles Court in fact explained why Brady obligations
must extend to the police, even when the prosecutor acted rea-
sonably. "[A]ny argument for excusing a prosecutor from disclos-
ing what he does not happen to know about boils down to a plea
to substitute the police for the prosecutor, and even for the courts
themselves, as the final arbiters of the government's obligation to
ensure fair trials."8' The Court was apparently concerned that
overzealous or corrupt police officers might intentionally conceal
evidence from the prosecutor." The defendant should not suffer
when the police have kept the prosecutor in the dark. The Brady
remedy of a new trial deters unfair conduct by state actors, police
and prosecutors alike."
2. The lower courts and the duties of nonprosecutors.
Some courts have come close to explicitly recognizing that
Brady imposes duties on state agents beyond the prosecutor's
office. When the defense files a pretrial search Brady request, the
prosecutor need not personally examine a file (for example, an
agent-witness's personnel fie) that may contain evidence favor-
able to the defense. Rather, it is sufficient if the state officer in
possession of the file examines it for favorable evidence." If the
8' Kyles, 115 S Ct at 1568.
' See also Jones v City of Chicago, 856 F2d 985, 995 (7th Cir 1988) (finding a Brady
violation in police "attempts to circumvent the rule... by retaining records in clandestine
files deliberately concealed from prosecutors").
' Nevertheless, independent discovery of evidence that the government has not dis-
closed is rare, and Brady probably has little deterrent effect on thoroughly corrupt offi-
cials. Brady may, however, encourage well intentioned prosecutors, police, and other
officials to deal responsibly with the conflicting impulses of law enforcement, reinforcing
their sense of procedural fairness. In fact, Brady may bolster the sense of obligation to
promote fairness in any state actor who knows that she is in a position to affect the
outcome of a trial.
Although Brady imposes extensive obligations on states to uncover the truth, de-
fense attorneys still must be aggressive with requests for evidence. Even well meaning
state officials are not as attuned to the potential that evidence will benefit the accused as
are defense attorneys. Unless the state official recognizes the favorable character of the
evidence, he will not disclose it. Further, the materiality standard allows some favorable
evidence to go undisclosed, so a defense attorney relying simply on the government's
Brady obligations will not see all of the favorable evidence available. Finally, the remedy
for a Brady violation arrives post-conviction, after much damage to one's client has
already been done and cannot be undone.
' See, for example, United States v Smith, 552 F2d 257, 261-62 (8th Cir 1977)
(holding Brady obligations satisfied when Drug Enforcement Agency screened its own files
for favorable evidence); United States v Jennings, 960 F2d 1488, 1492 (9th Cir 1992)
(endorsing Justice Department policy allowing individual law enforcement agencies,
rather than local prosecutors, to screen their files for Brady material); Commonwealth v
Donahue, 396 Mass 590, 487 NE2d 1351, 1357-58 (1986) ("[Tlhe prosecutor's only respon-
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examining officer determines that the file contains no material
and favorable evidence, he so informs the prosecutor, and neither
the prosecutor nor the defense actually views the file."5 While
this procedure allows other state agents to discharge and, at
least in some sense, assume part of the prosecutor's search Brady
obligations,86 the courts have chosen not to view it that way.
Instead, they correctly (but unsatisfyingly) hold that "the pros-
ecutor may be charged with the consequence of not having pro-
duced [the evidence] if this has the effect of denying the accused
a fair trial."7 Admittedly, these cases show only that Brady
duties can involve nonprosecutors, but other cases show more.
The facts of Commonwealth v Donahue are illustrative.8
The defendant was convicted of bank robbery in Massachusetts
state court. Both federal and state authorities investigated the
crime, although they apparently did not coordinate their investi-
gations. The defendant had hoped to present an alibi defense.
Unfortunately for him, his alibi witness, who was in the Federal
Witness Protection Program, refused to speak with the defense,
although he did speak on separate occasions with both federal
and state agents. The state prosecutor turned over the informa-
tion he obtained through his interview, but the FBI agent who
had interviewed the witness refused to disclose his notes, claim-
ing that they contained nothing helpful to the defense. The infor-
mation that the state prosecutor disclosed proved insufficient to
support the alibi, and the defendant chose not to call the witness.
However, the information in the FBI agent's notes strongly sup-
ported the alibi.8"
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court faulted the state
prosecutor for failing to seek the cooperation of the FBI, and it
held that the state prosecutor's failure denied the defendant a
sibility was to pass the request [for Brady material] along to the appropriate Federal
officials and to transmit the Federal response to counsel.").
85 Smith, 552 F2d at 261-62 (finding sufficient DEA assurances that their files did not
contain any exculpatory evidence).
' While the prosecutor's obligations shift to the examining agent, the prosecutor's
special knowledge does not. The prosecutor has both intimate familiarity with the facts of
the case and special legal knowledge. The prosecutor may thus assess more accurately the
significance of the evidence at issue. Since materiality must be judged in terms of all of
the evidence available in the case, Kyles, 115 S Ct at 1567, the state agent should resolve
doubtful questions in favor of disclosure to the prosecutor who then can exercise his own
expert judgment regarding the significance of the evidence. See Jennings, 960 F2d at
1492.
87 Smith, 552 F2d at 262.
396 Mass 590, 487 NE2d 1351, 1353-58 (1986).
89 Id at 1353-54.
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fair trial." But that is not the whole story. The court recognized
the possibility that the FBI would have refused to cooperate with
state prosecutors even had the state sought FBI assistance. The
court refused to "speculate on the further responsibilities, if any,
the prosecutor may have had if the Federal authorities had de-
clined to cooperate." 1 That is, even if the FBI agent refused to
disclose his notes to the prosecutor, the court presumably would
have considered only the state prosecutor's responsibilities. In-
stead, the court should have considered the FBI agent's responsi-
bility to ensure a fair trial.
A few cases have explicitly held that government agents
other than prosecutors have Brady obligations. For example, in
United States v Wood, the defendant was convicted of "obstruct-
ing the FDA's function of ensuring that prescription drugs are
safe and effective and dispensed pursuant to a prescription from
a practitioner licensed by law to administer such drugs."9" A key
prosecution witness had testified that the drugs dispensed by the
defendant were dangerous to humans. However, the FDA had in
its files a report that showed that the drugs in question were not
dangerous to humans. 3 The court recognized that the
prosecutor did not know about the precise contents of the file, but
the FDA did. As a result, the court held that "the FDA failed to
discharge its [Brady] obligation of disclosure." 4
The Wood court's reasoning suggests that the FDA agents
had an obligation of disclosure only because they had "consulted
with the prosecutor in the steps leading to the prosecution."5
The court did not hold that state agents generally have an obliga-
tion to disclose exculpatory evidence whenever they know of its
existence. Rather, it held that the FDA's cooperation with the
prosecution imposed Brady duties on the agency. In addition, the
court emphasized that the FDA is "the agency charged with ad-
ministration of the statute."6 The result should not be different
if the FDA had not cooperated in the prosecution but was still
aware of the trial. Any rule restricting the obligations of disclo-
sure only to those cooperating in the prosecution would endorse
'o Id at 1358 ("[T]he prosecutor's failure to [seek the cooperation of the FBI] denied
the defendant access to material exculpatory evidence.").
91 Id.
- 57 F3d 733, 735 (9th Cir 1995).
93 Id at 737.
9 Id at 735.
95 Id at 737.
96 Id.
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an indifference to the truth "unworthy of representatives of the
United States Government."97
Cases in both the Supreme Court and in lower courts show
that Brady obligations apply to nonprosecutors. 9' The next Sec-
tion addresses the proper analysis of those obligations.
B. The Scope of Nonprosecutors' Brady Obligations
Recognizing that Brady imposes duties on all state actors
improves the analysis of search Brady claims. Such claims can
succeed on two different bases. The prosecutor may have failed to
fulfill his general search Brady obligations. Alternatively, the
state actor in possession of the evidence may have failed to fulfill
his Brady obligations. Part II.B above discussed the factors
courts should employ to determine the scope of the prosecutor's
search Brady obligations." This Part analyzes how courts
should determine the scope of other state agents' Brady obliga-
tions.
While Brady imposes duties on all state agents, the differ-
ences between the prosecutor and all other state agents affect the
extent of their duties. First, the prosecutor is an officer of the
'9 Auten, 632 F2d at 481. For other cases imposing Brady obligations beyond prosecu-
tors, see Barbee, 331 F2d at 846 ("The duty to disclose is that of the state, which ordinari-
ly acts through the prosecuting attorney, but if he too is the victim of police suppression
of the material information, the state's failure is not on that account excused."); United
States v Bryant, 439 F2d 642, 650 (DC Cir 1971) ("The duty of disclosure affects not only
the prosecutor, but the Government as a whole, including its investigative agencies.").
" The holding of Arizona v Youngblood, 488 US 51 (1988), is not to the contrary. In
that case, the Supreme Court held that a defendant needs to show bad faith on the part of
the police in order to state a due process claim for failing to preserve potentially useful
evidence. Id at 58. There are good reasons to distinguish Youngblood and refuse to apply
its higher standard of police culpability in the Brady context. First, a classic Brady viola-
tion occurs "irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution." Brady, 373 US
at 87. Once we recognize that other state actors also have Brady obligations, there is no
reason to apply a different standard to them. Second, Youngblood dealt with only the
preservation of potentially exculpatory evidence. When such evidence is not preserved,
there is no way to know whether the failure to preserve it resulted in the loss of evidence
that would have been favorable to the defense. Youngblood requires a showing of bad
faith to bolster the inference that the police had something to gain by destroying the
evidence-an inference that supports the conclusion that the evidence lost was favorable
to the defense. When the evidence still exists, as in the Brady context, we can examine it
to determine its exculpatory character, and we need not use the level of police culpability
as a surrogate. Youngblood, 488 US at 57-58. Third, the remedy in cases involving de-
struction of potentially exculpatory evidence has to be acquittal. A new trial would be
fruitless because the disputed evidence has been destroyed. This dramatic and irreversible
result justifies imposing the tough burden on the defendant. In Brady cases, the court
orders the less dramatic new trial remedy.
" See text accompanying notes 56-74.
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court. He bears a greater responsibility for the integrity of the
proceeding than do other state actors. The prosecutor is especial-
ly responsible, as the government's representative in court, for
fairness. He has a special responsibility to ensure that the evi-
dence presented is truthfiul and that the government presents a
complete story to the court. Second, the prosecutor is the captain
of the state's team. "A prosecution that withholds evi-
dence... which, if made available would tend to exculpate [the
accused] ... casts the prosecutor in the role of an architect of a
proceeding that does not comport with standards of justice."00
The prosecutor, as head of the team that presents the
government's story in court, is responsible for all parts of the
story in a way that other state actors are not.
Although Brady imposes an obligation on the prosecutor to
search for evidence not in his possession, this Comment suggests
that its rationale does not impose that obligation on other state
actors. Rather, Brady requires other state actors to disclose evi-
dence in their possession that they know' can help exculpate
the accused. In other words, prosecutors have search Brady and
classic Brady obligations, while other state actors have only clas-
sic Brady obligations. 2 To see why, we must describe how a
nonprosecutor can respond when she learns of evidence potential-
ly favorable to the defense not in her possession.
Assume that a nonprosecutor is alerted to the possibility that
a file held by another state agent may contain exculpatory evi-
dence. Assume further that the nonprosecutor has not seen the
file and cannot assess its potential value to the defense, but
knows that the possibility is more than "utter speculation." 3
Since the nonprosecutor is not the captain of the government's
team, she need not examine the fie herself. Indeed, she may not
have the power to compel the other state agent to surrender it to
10 Brady, 373 US at 87-88.
... The relevant knowledge here is knowledge learned in connection with one's role as
a state agent. For example, if a friend of a Labor Department statistician tells her that he
committed a crime of which another man is accused, the Due Process Clause does not re-
quire her to disclose the confession to the prosecutor. In such a case, the individual as
state agent does not have the knowledge, only the individual as private citizen.
1"2 The prosecutor may, however, ask a state agent to satisfy the prosecutor's search
Brady obligations by reviewing a file in the state agent's possession for exculpatory
evidence. See text accompanying notes 85-87. This procedure triggers the state agent's
classic Brady obligations but does not impose search Brady obligations on her.
" See United States v Brooks, 966 F2d 1500, 1504 (DC Cir 1992) (noting that suspi-
don of finding exculpatory evidence which rises above utter speculation can trigger the
prosecutor's search Brady duties).
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her. Still, the nonprosecutor does have classic Brady obligations.
Classic Brady obligations include the duty to disclose the possi-
bility of evidence favorable to the defense to individuals capable
of making the inquiry.' This duty requires the nonprosecutor
to inform the prosecutor (or the defendant) of the basis of her
suspicion if she cannot, or will not, undertake the effort to uncov-
er the truth herself.
Imposing search Brady obligations on all state actors, then,
is unnecessary. For whenever nonprosecutors know enough to
trigger the search Brady obligations of a prosecutor, they must
pass that knowledge on to the prosecutor or the defense. Once
the appropriate people have such knowledge, Brady obligations
can work in their ordinary fashion to ensure that the truth
emerges.' 5  Imposing search Brady obligations on
nonprosecutors would add little if any protection to defendants.
Further, it would not aid the search for truth because it would
often pointlessly impose a duty to obtain a file on a person inca-
pable of obtaining it.'
Search Brady analysis, thus, recognizes that the Due Process
Clause is violated whenever the prosecutor does not disclose
evidence favorable to the defense that the prosecutor should have
known about. Sometimes, he may not know of the evidence be-
cause of his own failure; other times other state agents may fail
o6 United States v Shaffer, 789 F2d 682, 690 (9th Cir 1986), citing United States v
Griggs, 713 F2d 672, 674 (11th Cir 1983).
106 To be sure, bureaucracies are not terribly responsive institutions. Recognizing the
Brady obligations of all state actors will not suddenly set in motion the vast machinery of
the state to uncover the truth in criminal trials. However, recognizing the constitutional
responsibility of bureaucrats can affect how they perceive their jobs, which can alter their
behavior.
Further, the analysis of Brady presented here places a fairly substantial burden on
the state. The costs of educating all state employees about their obligations under Brady
and of putting in place a mechanism for reporting evidence to the prosecutor may be
large. In fact, if the costs are very substantial, a state may choose not to undertake them,
preferring instead to incur the costs of the occasional post-conviction reversal under
Brady. These cost calculations explain why the expansion of Brady here proposed may not
alter the behavior of state actors very much. But it does not follow that courts should
ignore the state's constitutional violation when a particular defendant is fortunate enough
to discover it.
"08 Recognizing the classic Brady obligations of state actors other than prosecutors
does create a somewhat awkward terminology. A search Brady claim may succeed due to
the failure of a nonprosecutor to satisfy his classic Brady obligations. The peculiarity
stems from how search Brady claims are defined, namely, as all Brady claims based on
evidence not known to the prosecutor. See text accompanying note 18. But although the
terminology may be awkward, the analysis is not.
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him. Either way, the defendant is denied due process by a state
agent.
IV. IMPLICATIONS OF NONPROSECUTORS' BRADY OBLIGATIONS
Recognizing that all state agents have Brady obligations
offers a superior explanation for the cases. For example, it helps
locate the constitutional error. If only prosecutors have Brady
obligations, then the Kyles court found a violation of the Due
Process Clause in the absence of any wrongful behavior. The
prosecutors in those cases acted reasonably in their efforts to
present the truth to the court. To find a Due Process Clause
violation in their conduct separates due process analysis from its
principle.
Due process is not denied unless some state actor acted im-
properly, at least negligently, in his effort to uncover the truth. It
is logically possible to find a violation of the Due Process Clause
even in the absence of any negligent conduct.07 As we have
seen, the Supreme Court does not require negligence by the pros-
ecutor.0 8 But the Court holds prosecutors strictly liable for
practical reasons. It wants to be sure that the defendant does not
suffer because investigators kept the prosecutor in the dark. To
extend this strict liability to all state actors places an impractical
burden on the state. It is unrealistic to expect all state actors to
become familiar with every criminal case and determine whether
there is buried somewhere in their ifies evidence favorable to the
accused. There may be cases in which the exculpatory evidence
was in the government's possession, but it was unreasonable for
" One case suggests that negligent conduct by the state is irrelevant and cites
Supreme Court language to support that proposition. Walker v AL. Lockhart, 763 F2d
942, 959 (8th Cir 1985), citing United States v Agurs, 427 US 97, 110 (1976) (arguing that
"the State's constitutional obligation is not measured by [a police officer's] willfulness or
negligence"). But a careful look at the Supreme Court's language shows that the Court
has recognized only that negligence by the prosecutor in search Brady cases is not essen-
tial. See Agurs, 427 US at 110 ("If the suppression of evidence results in constitutional
error, it is because of the character of the evidence, not the character of the prosecutor.")
(emphasis added); Smith v Phillips, 455 US 209, 219 (1982) ("[T]he touchstone of due
process analysis in cases of alleged prosecutorial misconduct is the fairness of the trial,
not the culpability of the prosecutor.") (emphasis added).
Since the Court has not explicitly recognized the Brady obligations of all state ac-
tors, it has not spoken directly about whether negligence by some state actor is necessary
to support a Brady claim. However, Walker's language is broader than necessary to reach
its result. The court recognized that "the significance of [the evidence] should not have
been lost on [the police officer]." Walker, 763 F2d at 958-59. The officer had a classic
Brady obligation to disclose the evidence to the prosecutor, if not the defendant.
" See text accompanying notes 78-83.
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any state actor to realize its significance to a criminal trial.'
Such claims are properly brought under Rule 33 of the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure asserting newly discovered evi-
dence," not under Brady. In such cases, the defendant is not
denied something promised him by the Constitution. The Due
Process Clause promises no more (but also no less) than the
reasonable effort of state agents serving the truth.
In addition, recognizing the Brady obligations of all state
agents provides a clear legal reason why it makes little sense to
limit Brady claims to cases in which the agent possessing the
evidence is under the same sovereignty as the prosecutor."'
Possession by any government agent should do. The Supreme
Court grounded Brady in principles of due process. The Fifth
Amendment's Due Process Clause controls the federal govern-
ment and the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause con-
trols state governments. The approach presented here recognizes
that both Clauses operate at the same time, but especially in
cases involving cooperation between state and federal authorities.
Perhaps a federal prosecutor does not violate Brady when he fails
to discover exculpatory evidence hidden from him by state
agents. But the state agent does violate Brady.
Beyond promoting intellectual coherence, recharacterizing
Brady obligations can change the results of some cases. A
prosecutor's search Brady obligations will often overlap with
another state agent's classic Brady obligations, but each captures
cases not caught by the other.
00 See Joseph, 996 F2d at 40-41, discussed at text accompanying notes 57-58; Bell v
Coughlin, 820 F Supp 780, 787 (S D NY 1993), aff'd, 17 F3d 390 (2d Cir 1993), cert
denied, 114 8 Ct 2685 (1994) (A state investigator physically possessed a ballistics report
that contained exculpatory information, but he did not have knowledge of the report's
contents because it was buried in a 108-page document prepared by the FBI.).
110 The basic requirements for a successful claim under Rule 33 are: "(1) The evidence
is newly discovered and was unknown to the defendant at the time of trial; (2) Failure to
detect the evidence was not due to lack of due diligence by defendant; (3) The evidence is
material, not merely cumulative or impeaching;, and (4) The evidence will probably pro-
duce an acquittal." United States v Peha, 949 F2d 751, 758 (5th Cir 1991). There are three
important differences between Brady and Rule 33. First, Brady requires that the evidence
create a "reasonable probability that.., the result of the proceeding would have been
different." United States v Bagley, 473 US 667, 682 (1985). Rule 33 asks more: the evi-
dence must probably produce an acquittal. Second, while impeachment evidence can be
Brady material, see note 11, mere impeachment evidence will not earn a new trial under
Rule 33. Finally, motions for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence must be
made within two years after final judgment. FRCrP 33. There is no time limit on Brady
claims.
. See text accompanying notes 30-33.
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We have already seen cases in which the prosecutor's search
Brady obligations, and not anyone else's classic Brady obliga-
tions, encourage full disclosure of the state's evidence bearing on
the truth. For example, requiring the prosecutor to acquire the
criminal record of a government witness does not implicate
anyone's classic Brady obligations, since the state agents in pos-
session of the records almost surely are unaware that the subject
of the records will testify in a criminal trial." Classic Brady
obligations alone would not cover this basic case.
Likewise, imposing classic Brady obligations on all state
actors will reach cases not covered by the prosecutor's search
Brady obligations. Recognizing the classic Brady obligations of all
state actors may change the result in high-profile cases. As the
facts of a trial and its details become more widely known, it be-
comes more likely that some state agent will realize that infor-
mation in his files may be favorable to the defense.
More importantly, the facts of People v White illustrate how
extending classic Brady duties to all state agents may benefit
criminal defendants generally, not just the few whose trials at-
tract significant media attention." The defendant was arrested
on a rape charge while on parole for another offense. His parole
officer conducted an investigation into the incident, which includ-
ed an interview with the arresting officer. Records of those inter-
views could have contained information favorable to the accused.
Since the parole officer had conducted the investigation for pur-
poses independent of the prosecution (a parole revocation pro-
ceeding), the court held that he had no connection to the prosecu-
tor."4 Since the prosecutor was actually unaware of the exis-
tence of the report and had no connection with the state agent
who prepared it, no Brady violation would arise under the stan-
dard view."
Recognizing that the parole officer has classic Brady obliga-
tions could change the result. If the parole officer knew that the
records in his possession were favorable to the defense, then he
violated the Due Process Clause by not turning them over to the
defense or at least notifying the prosecutor. For example, the
parole officer's report may have contained contradictory factual
" See text accompanying note 64.
21 210 AD2d 447, 620 NYS2d 437, 437-38 (NY App Div 1994).
114 Id.
"' Perhaps, however, the defendant could still compel examination of the records by
making a specific request for them. See text accompanying notes 66-70.
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statements by witnesses. The parole officer was surely in a posi-
tion to recognize evidence favorable to the defense; he knew why
the defendant had been arrested and what he was accused of do-
ing. If the parole officer's investigation uncovered favorable evi-
dence, the state should not be able to keep it secret merely be-
cause it was not prepared for use by the prosecutor.
Of course, the parole officer's report may also have contained
favorable evidence that the parole officer reasonably could not
recognize. If a witness's statement at trial conflicts with his
statement to the parole officer, and the parole officer did not
follow the trial, the parole officer could not know of the conflict.
In the absence of such knowledge, the parole officer's classic
Brady obligation to disclose the report is not triggered. In fact,
under these circumstances, assuming that the parole officer has
never shown his report to the prosecutor, it is unreasonable to
expect any state agent to know that the exculpatory evidence
exists. This evidence, if it emerges, is properly treated not
under Brady, but as newly discovered evidence under Rule 33 of
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.
However, the analysis changes if the witness whose testimo-
ny differs from his statements to the parole officer is himself a
state agent, perhaps a police officer. If a police officer knows that
the parole officer has evidence that could be used to impeach his
credibility, the police officer should disclose this fact to the pros-
ecutor, who should, in turn, disclose it to the defendant. Stated
broadly, all testifying state agents have a classic Brady duty to
disclose evidence that materially undermines their credibility.
The police officer's obligation to disclose evidence undermin-
ing his credibility has powerful potential. It suggests a new line
of attack for defendants wishing to challenge a conviction based
on testimony from an officer who has engaged in misconduct,
such as peijury or extortion, prior to trial. Some courts have not
been receptive to claims that the government suppressed evi-
dence when that claim is based on the discovery that a police
officer, who testified at trial, had in the past engaged in illegal
activity which could be used for impeachment. For example, a
New York appellate court held that when police officers engage in
misconduct, they act "not in furtherance of law enforcement but
rather in pursuit of an unlawful scheme of their own.... .""
116 To be sure, the state's witness himself holds the favorable information; he alone
knows of both statements. But, assuming the witness is not himself a state agent, his
knowledge cannot be attributed to the state.
"" People v Vasquez, 214 AD2d 93, 631 NYS2d 322, 326 (NY App Div 1995), citing
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That is, police officers who engage in misconduct are not state
actors when they so act. Therefore, when they conceal such be-
havior, there is no Brady violation because (even under this
Comment's broadened view) Brady duties apply only to state
actors.
But such analysis misses the point of Brady. Perhaps the
officer was not a state actor when he engaged in the underlying
corrupt conduct, but he was a state actor when he testified
against the defendant and concealed his misconduct from the
defense. There can be no doubt that the officer knew that the evi-
dence, which bears on his credibility, is favorable to the defense.
If the evidence satisfies the standard of materiality, then his
failure to disclose it violates Brady." It may be unreasonable
to expect that officers will disclose their misconduct; they proba-
bly will not. However, this does not cure the Brady violation if
the defendant is fortunate enough to learn of the corruption after
his trial."
Commonwealth v Waters, 410 Mass 224, 571 NE2d 399, 402 (1991) (arguing that "the
corrupt officer is not acting as an 'arm of the prosecution' when he or she is concealing his
or her own criminal activity, unrelated to the case against a particular defendant").
" The Supreme Court of New Jersey has ordered a hearing to determine the suffi-
ciency of the evidence supporting the conviction in a case in which the defendants, con-
victed of drunk driving, discovered after trial that the police officer had falsified
breathalyzer results in prior cases. State v Gookins, 135 NJ 42, 637 A2d 1255, 1256-58
(1994). In addition, the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia responded similarly to
the discovery that a forensic serologist systematically falsified his reports, ordering new
trials in all cases in which his testimony had a material effect on the verdict. In re an
Investigation of the W Va State Police Crime Lab, Serology Div, 190 W Va 321, 438 SE2d
501, 506 (1993). Neither of these results rested on the rationale that the corrupt official
violated Brady. Rather, both cases relied on the fact that the misconduct was so pervasive
that the court could treat the corrupt officer's testimony as false in each prior case. In re
W Va State Police, 438 SE2d at 504, 506; Gookins, 637 A2d at 1260. This rationale is
probably correct, but it should only apply in extreme circumstances. A state agent can
engage in conduct that undermines his credibility--evidence of which is favorable to the
defense-without that conduct being so pervasive as to justify an inference that all of the
agent's prior testimony was false.
"9 Admittedly, this analysis has potentially broad consequences. It suggests that if a
police officer perjured himself five years ago, and we have learned of it after he has since
testified in 500 cases, then all 500 convicts should get a materiality hearing to determine
whether Brady requires a new trial. Perhaps the fear of a flood of Brady claims motivated
the mistaken analysis in Vasquez. Indeed, courts may need to develop procedural devices
to deal with these claims quickly and to weed out the frivolous ones. For example, courts
could borrow from Franks v Delaware, 438 US 154 (1978), and require, in cases where the
Brady claim is based on police misconduct unrelated to the case, that the defendant make
a "substantial preliminary showing" of materiality before the court will entertain the
claim. (Franks establishes a procedure for defendants to challenge the veracity of a police
officer's facially sufficient warrant affidavit.) It is beyond the scope of this Comment to
hash out the procedural details associated with the expansion of Brady to all state actors.
Instead, this. Comment demonstrates that prior police misconduct raises serious Brady
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CONCLUSION
The Brady rule aims at discovering the truth and achieving
fairness in the criminal process. Courts must take the utmost
care when there is reason to doubt the accuracy of a conviction.
When state actors have in their possession evidence that raises
such doubts, then the courts must make them produce it. Unfor-
tunately, the various circumstances under which the state should
be expected to uncover exculpatory evidence buried in its vast
files do not lend themselves to a precise rule. Still, courts can do
better than they have. They can recognize that all state agents
share Brady duties. Doing so will put all state agents on notice
that they must play their part in ensuring that the truth emerg-
es in criminal proceedings. Further, courts can recognize all of
the relevant factors of search Brady claims and discuss how they
interact in each case. Greater clarity in the analysis will better
guide the well meaning prosecutor and investigator, ensuring
that they are not the tools of arbitrary power but contributors to
a system that dispenses justice.
issues and that courts should respond accordingly.
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